Where’s My Refund? How to Address Overpaid Domestic Support Obligations under the Bankruptcy Code by Nowak, Amanda
Emory Bankruptcy Developments Journal 
Volume 36 
Issue 2 The Seventeenth Annual Emory Bankruptcy Developments Journal Symposium 
2020 
Where’s My Refund? How to Address Overpaid Domestic Support 
Obligations under the Bankruptcy Code 
Amanda Nowak 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/ebdj 
Recommended Citation 
Amanda Nowak, Where’s My Refund? How to Address Overpaid Domestic Support Obligations under the 
Bankruptcy Code, 36 Emory Bankr. Dev. J. 511 (2020). 
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/ebdj/vol36/iss2/6 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Emory Law Scholarly Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Emory Bankruptcy Developments Journal by an authorized editor of Emory Law 
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact law-scholarly-commons@emory.edu. 
NOWAK_7.15.20 7/15/2020 2:08 PM 
 
WHERE’S MY REFUND? HOW TO ADDRESS OVERPAID 
DOMESTIC SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE 
BANKRUPTCY CODE 
ABSTRACT 
Domestic support obligations are a source of much debate among 
bankruptcy courts throughout the United States. Concomitantly, overpayments 
of domestic support obligations are no exception. Courts across the nation are 
split as to whether overpayments of support debts fall within the definition of a 
domestic support obligation listed in 11 U.S.C. §101(14A). The specific 
language enumerated in §101(14A) giving rise to the jurisdictional split pertains 
to whether the debt in question is “in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or 
support.” Courts that deem overpaid support debts as domestic support 
obligations focus on the debt’s function at the time of the original agreement 
whereas other courts reject this approach and view the overpayment as a simple 
money judgment. This discrepancy has led to an inequity for families across the 
nation as jurisdictions throughout the United States produce distinctive 
interpretations of overpaid support debts. This Comment will specifically 
analyze overpaid domestic support obligations with reference to the 11 U.S.C. 
§507 list of priorities and §523 exceptions to discharge. In order to remedy the 
jurisdictional split, I propose a new set of standards for bankruptcy courts to 
follow when confronted with overpaid domestic support obligations.  
Instead of understanding child support and alimony collectively within the 
term domestic support obligation, I propose that the two obligations should be 
considered independently. The emerging standards include three main factors: 
(1) all domestic support obligations should be excepted from discharge, (2) the 
overpayment of child support should be entitled to priority status whereas (3) 
the overpayment of alimony should not. These standards are determined after 
analyzing the jurisdictional split, Congress’s intent in drafting the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code, the substance of the obligation, and the intent and current 
condition of the parties. Exceptions to the standards arise when confronted with 
unique circumstances; however, this interpretation should be followed as a 
general rule. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Courts across the nation attempt to comply with two competing principles 
laid out in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (Code):1 (1) the debtor’s fresh start and (2) 
the creditors’ right to payment.2 When confronted with an overpaid support 
obligation,3 it becomes difficult for courts to appropriately apply these 
principles.4 The Code inadvertently fails to clarify what “overpaid support 
obligations” are and how these debts should be managed throughout bankruptcy 
proceedings.5 This gap in the Code creates an inequity for families across the 
nation because different jurisdictions produce differing outcomes on how these 
debts are treated. 
In the Southern District of Ohio, in In re Norbut, Margaret and Theodore 
Norbut were divorced after twenty-seven years of marriage.6 The Judgment 
Entry and Decree of Divorce dictated that Margaret was entitled to fifteen years 
of alimony payments that remained in effect until Theodore’s retirement.7 Years 
later, Theodore sought termination of the alimony payments in state court as a 
result of his early retirement.8 After years of litigation, the state court 
retroactively terminated his alimony payments, resulting in Margaret owing 
$72,694.14 in overpayment expenses.9 Subsequently, Margaret filed a petition 
under chapter 7 of the Code.10 Theodore then commenced an adversary 
proceeding against Margaret seeking summary judgment for the non-
dischargeability of the debt declaring it a domestic support obligation.11 In other 
words, while Margaret would no longer owe her other debts once she concludes 
the bankruptcy process, her obligation to Theodore would survive. The 
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Ohio relied on the previous state 
court decision and granted Theodore’s motion for summary judgment.12 
Specifically, the court found “that an obligation consists of support whenever 
 
 1 Robert C. Yan, The Sign Says “Help Wanted, Inquire Within” — But It May Not Matter if You Have 
Ever Filed (or Plan to File) for Bankruptcy, 10 AM. BANK. INST. L. REV. 429, 432 (2002). 
 2 Id. (citations omitted). 
 3 See infra Background Part B (explaining what a domestic support obligation entails). 
 4 See Beth Holiday, Annotation, Construction and Application of Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and 
Consumer Protection Act’s (BAPCPA’s) Provision Defining “Domestic Support Obligations” (11 U.S.C.A. 
§ 101(14A)), 56 A.L.R. FED. 2D 439 (2011). 
 5 See generally 4 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 523.11 (16th ed. 2018). 
 6 In re Norbut, 387 B.R. 199, 201–02 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2008). 
 7 Id. at 202. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. at 205. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. at 211. 
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there is a legal duty to pay such an obligation.”13 The court followed previous 
decisions that found overpaid support obligations to be “in the nature of alimony, 
maintenance or support.”14 
In the Middle District of Florida, in In re Galiardo, Joyce Lynn Galiardo and 
Frederick Galiardo were divorced in 1992.15 A separation agreement ordered 
Frederick to pay Joyce alimony payments in installments over a number of 
years.16 Following the satisfaction of the installments, Frederick unintentionally 
continued to pay Joyce alimony for an additional two years.17 Upon recognizing 
this mistake, Frederick brought suit in state court where Joyce was ordered to 
pay him $222,650.00 for unjust enrichment.18 Subsequently, Joyce filed a 
petition for chapter 7 relief under the bankruptcy code which was later converted 
to a chapter 13 case.19 Similar to the Norbut case, the question at issue was 
whether the $222,650.00 retained its character as a domestic support 
obligation.20 In reaching its conclusion in In re Galiardo, the Bankruptcy Court 
for the Middle District of Florida reasoned that Frederick did not have any 
personal need for support in regard to the repayment of the debt.21 The court 
found that the debt was not in the nature of support and therefore was not a 
domestic support obligation.22 In contrast to In re Norbut, the bankruptcy court 
in this case decided to overlook the state court’s decisions and declared the 
overpaid debt as dischargeable.23 
These two cases consider the same issue but reach two vastly different 
conclusions.24 Both courts attempt to decipher how overpaid support obligations 
should be treated under the Code. Different conclusions emerge because the 
Code does not provide clear instructions on how to proceed when confronted 
with an overpaid support obligation. This complication affects the personal lives 
of individuals across the country.25 An equitable remedy must rise to the surface 
 
 13 Id. at 210 (internal citation omitted). 
 14 Allen Co. Child Enf’t Agency v. Baker (In re Baker), 294 B.R. 281, 289 n.3 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2002) 
(citing 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7)(B) (2019); see also In re Norbut, 387 B.R. at 199, 210–11. 
 15 Galiardo v. Galiardo (In re Galiardo), 526 B.R. 897, 898 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2013). 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. at 898–99. 
 19 Id. at 899. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. at 900. 
 22 Id. at 902. 
 23 Compare In re Galiardo, 526 B.R. at 902, with In re Norbut, 387 B.R. 199, 211 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 
2008). 
 24 Compare In re Galiardo, 526 B.R. 897, with In re Norbut, 387 B.R. 199. 
 25 See In re Galiardo, 526 B.R. 897; In re Vanhook, 426 B.R. 296 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2010); In re Norbut, 
NOWAK_7.15.20 7/15/2020 2:08 PM 
514 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 36 
to allow individuals to obtain uniform treatment in bankruptcy proceedings 
across the country.  
Federal bankruptcy law and state family law inevitably overlap with one 
another. Domestic relations are traditionally matters reserved for state courts,26 
but once a debtor files a petition for bankruptcy relief, federal law comes into 
play.27 The balance between state and federal law in bankruptcy is clear from 
the plain language of the Code. The Code, throughout its many provisions, 
respects the decisions of the states28 and looks to state law for guidance when 
considering issues of family law that are not clearly discernable.29 When a 
domestic support obligation (DSO) has been overpaid by a creditor, the relevant 
state law must be addressed to determine the nature of the debt. When federal 
bankruptcy courts neglect state court decisions, an incohesive, mechanical 
approach is forced upon federal courts when deciphering whether a judgment 
can be stretched to fit within the definition of a DSO or contracted to be excluded 
from its terms. Because the Code does not provide clear guidelines on how to 
settle an overpaid support debt, sound arguments can be crafted for either 
interpretation resulting in inequitable outcomes.  
This Comment proposes a new set of standards to remedy this inequity. The 
standards are characterized as follows: (1) all overpaid DSOs must be excepted 
from discharge,30 (2) the overpayment of child support should be entitled to 
priority status,31 whereas (3) the overpayment of alimony and maintenance 
should not be entitled to priority status. These standards are determined after 
analyzing the jurisdictional split, Congress’s intent in drafting the Code, the 
substance of the obligation, and the intent and current condition of the parties. 
The division between alimony and child support is vital because the mothers and 
fathers of society should not be disincentivized from continuing to pay their 
child support. If an overpaid support debt is not returned to the provider, this 
may cause future providers to withhold their child support payments. Exceptions 
 
387 B.R. 199; Allen Co. Child Enf’t Agency v. Baker (In re Baker), 294 B.R. 281 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2002); 
Kassicieh v. Mascotti, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 4494 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007). 
 26 See In re Norbut, 387 B.R. at 210. 
 27 See 11 U.S.C. § 301 (2019). 
 28 See § 523(a)(5) (to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, for alimony to, maintenance for, or 
support of such spouse or child, in connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree or other order of a 
court of record, determination made in accordance with State or territorial law by a governmental unit, or 
property settlement agreement . . . .). 
 29 See In re Norbut, 387 B.R. at 210 (citation omitted). 
 30 An exception from discharge will allow a creditor’s claim to pass through bankruptcy unaffected.  
 31 See infra Background Part D.1. 
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to the listed standards arise when there is a unique circumstance, but courts 
should follow this interpretation as a general rule. 
I. BACKGROUND 
This Comment first considers foundational principles underlying the 
proposed standards. Generally, the foundation arises from (1) the family unit, 
divorce, and support obligations, (2) the definition of a domestic support 
obligation and how it relates to overpayments, (3) why overpayments occur, and 
(4) how these debts function within the Code.  
A. The Family Unit, the Introduction of Divorce, and Emerging Support 
Obligations 
The family unit is a delicate yet resilient facet of society. The significance 
of bankruptcy decisions concerning overpayments of DSOs are best understood 
through a discussion of the values and evolving functions of the family unit. The 
family unit is the central and most important part of civilization.32 “Marriage and 
family are perhaps society’s oldest and most resilient institutions.”33 Since the 
creation of humanity, individuals have situated themselves into units of families 
as a defense mechanism for various types of support.34 Over thousands of years, 
families have surmounted economic, legal, and societal fluctuations while 
evolving along the way.35 In whichever way a family decides to function, it is in 
society’s best interest to create a positive outlook and environment for families 
across the world.36 The legal system must consider familial values when 
dictating how to treat certain DSOs within bankruptcy because efficient legal 
systems are tailored to deep societal structures. 
As time has passed, the family unit has endured the introduction of divorce. 
Now commonplace in American culture, statistics from the American 
Psychological Association indicate that forty to fifty percent of the American 
population divorces.37 Because divorce is now recognized as a societal norm, 
 
 32 See William Bennet, Stronger Families, Stronger Societies, N.Y. TIMES, (Apr. 24, 2012, 6:43 PM), 
https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/04/24/are-family-values-outdated/stronger-families-stronger-
societies. 
 33 John DeFrain et al., Creating a Stronger Family: Why are Families So Important?, NEBGUIDE (Sept. 
2008), http://extensionpublications.unl.edu/assets/pdf/g1890.pdf. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Marriage and Divorce, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N, https://www.apa.org/topics/divorce/ (last visited Jan. 31, 
2020). 
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the culture within the United States has adjusted and reconstructed family life to 
reflect the notion that a traditional family unit is no longer necessary for the 
success of future and current generations.38 Families will continue to prosper 
when divorces are finalized appropriately. Couples may achieve divorce through 
litigation or settlement, but similar to other lawsuits, couples may resolve 
divorce by a settlement agreement commonly referred to as a separation 
agreement.39 The creation of laws and regulations governing this new familial 
norm of divorce has allowed society to develop ways to interact and integrate 
divorced families into our communities in a way that does not threaten the fabric 
of society.40  
The way in which a family functions has far reaching effects.41 “Sustainable 
societies depend upon strong families.”42 Anything that tampers with the 
functioning of a family may cause widespread consequences that impact other 
areas within society.43 For example, lower rates of educational success for 
children emerge when families are confronted with high rates of poverty.44 
Bankruptcy law destabilizes families by neglecting to address how overpaid 
DSOs should be treated under the Code. The Code does not supply a uniform 
set of standards for overpaid support obligations which results in an inequity 
amongst families across the nation.  
The Code intends for a uniform application of its laws.45 Nonetheless, a 
jurisdictional split exists among bankruptcy courts on how to construe 
overpayments of support obligations.46 This split affects families across the 
country in dissimilar ways.47 In this instance, the continuous inconsistent 
application of bankruptcy law has left families in a state of disarray. “The family 
is the human institution most vital to the perpetuation of the [human] race, and 
 
 38 See Kristen Glaeser, Threatening the Fabric of Our Society: Divorce in Modern Societies, 4 
OLGETHORPE J. OF UNDERGRADUATE RES. 1 (2014), https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/cgi/viewcontent. 
cgi?article=1039&context=ojur. 
 39 Meredith Johnson, At the Intersection of Bankruptcy and Divorce: Property Division Debts under the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 91, 95 (1997).  
 40 See Glaeser, supra note 38, at 1.  
 41 See DeFrain, supra note 33. 
 42 Institute for Family Studies, Strong Families, Sustainable Societies, INST. FOR FAM. STUD. BLOG 
(Sept. 18, 2013), https://ifstudies.org/blog/strong-families-sustainable-societies.  
 43 See id. (citing to studies showing that children are less likely to graduate from college when they do 
not have a strong family unit).  
 44 Id. 
 45 See Joseph Pace, Bankruptcy as Constitutional Property: Using Statutory Entitlement Theory to 
Abrogate State Sovereign Immunity, 119 YALE L.J. 1568, 1592 (2010).  
 46 See cases cited supra note 25. 
 47 See cases cited supra note 25. 
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its sound ordering [is] the consideration of deepest social concern.”48 Society 
encourages individuals to have strong familial values that the Code reflects.49 
When litigation arises concerning overpaid DSO debts, bankruptcy courts must 
diligently interpret these values within the Code and uphold standards that are 
not contrary to society’s constructions.50  
Child support and spousal support arise from separation agreements.51 Both 
spousal support and child support were created as remedies available to 
individuals upon separation and are currently used as bargaining tools in divorce 
proceedings.52 Child support and spousal support serve as vital components of 
divorce. Support obligations are often seen as contentious aspects of divorce 
proceedings, but nonetheless, they must be settled in order to maintain the 
equilibrium of the family unit. Without legal standards, the family unit would 
fail to function properly following a divorce.  
Child support is a legal mechanism for the support of a minor provided by 
the child’s parents or legal guardians.53 Child support orders are at issue in a 
multitude of contexts including divorce, annulment, and direct suits for child 
support.54 The amount of support is determined by two main factors: (1) the 
needs of the child and (2) the parent’s ability to pay.55 Children are the “true 
assets of the State[,]” and protecting them is society’s highest priority.56 Child 
support cases are controversial because setting guidelines in the best interest of 
a child does not amount to a simple calculation.57 The future of the world is 
determined by subsequent generations, and those generations learn and develop 
from the consequences of the present.58 When confronted with a divorce, 
children must be provided with adequate care and sources of stability for both 
the success of themselves and the success of society.59 Court orders mandate 
 
 48 Robert W. Kelso, The Changing Societal Setting of Alimony Law, 2 L. AND CONTEMP. PROB. 186, 189 
(1939). 
 49 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 507(a)(1), 523(a)(5) (2019). 
 50 See Bennet, supra note 32.  
 51 See Johnson, supra note 39, at 95. 
 52 See Judith G. McMullen, Spousal Support in the 21st Century, 29 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 1 (2014). 
 53 See 1 Collier Family Law and the Bankruptcy Code ¶ 3.02 (16th ed. 2018). 
 54 See Amy H. Kastely, An Essay in Family Law: Property Division, Alimony, Child Support, and Child 
Custody, 6 U. HAW. L. REV. 381, 416 (1984). 
 55 See id.  
 56 See Kelso, supra note 48, at 189. 
 57 See id.  
 58 See id.  
 59 See id.  
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child support obligations and if a parent neglects those payments it can result in 
serious legal consequences for contempt, including incarceration.60 
Spousal support, otherwise known as alimony or maintenance, derives 
directly from divorce proceedings.61 Spousal support is defined as any payment 
made to a former spouse that is both for the sustenance and support of that former 
spouse.62 A spouse, who made sacrifices and contributions during the course of 
a marriage, must be able “to continue to live according to the economic standard 
that was established during marriage.”63 Likewise, courts’ consider a spouse’s 
“ability to pay” when rendering orders.64 Courts consider many factors when 
deciding on an issue of alimony.65 Most jurisdictions have been moving away 
from distributing awards of permanent alimony and have instead been awarding 
increasing amounts of rehabilitative alimony.66 This new trend of alimony 
distributions focuses more on the facts of the case instead of relying on sweeping 
conclusions.67  
Divorce and bankruptcy go hand in hand with one another. The correlation 
between financial hardship and divorce is irrefutable.68 Financial distress is 
oftentimes a direct cause of divorce for the vast majority of Americans.69 Once 
a couple initiates a divorce proceeding, they incur more costs through the 
process of divorcing.70 A typical divorce costs around $15,500, and a common 
hourly rate for a divorce attorney is $250 an hour.71 Many individuals are left 
 
 60 See Tonya L. Brito, Fathers Behind Bars: Rethinking Child Support Policy Toward Low-Income 
Noncustodial Fathers and Their Families, 15 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 617, 619 (2012). 
 61 For the purpose of this comment, alimony and maintenance are considered interchangeable terms. See 
Kelso, supra note 48, at 193.  
 62 See Kelso, supra note 48, at 193. 
 63 Toby Solomon, Trends in Alimony Law, 1989 N.J. LAW. 30 (1989). 
 64 See 1 Collier Family Law and the Bankruptcy Code ¶ 3.02 (16th ed. 2018). 
 65 See Solomon, supra note 63, at 30–31 (1989) (listing the actual need and ability of the parties to pay, 
the duration of the marriage, the age, physical and emotional health of the parties, the standard of living, the 
earning capacities, the length of absence from the job market and so on and so forth). 
 66 See Jeff Landers, What Divorcing Women Need To Know about Alimony ‘Reform,’ FORBES (May 17, 
2013), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jefflanders/2013/05/17/what-divorcing-women-need-to-know-about-alimony-
reform/#556764c51260. 
 67 See Laura W. Morgan, Current Trends in Alimony Law: Where Are We Now?, AM. BAR ASS’N (Apr. 1, 
2012), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/gpsolo/publications/gpsolo_ereport/2012/april_2012/current_ 
trends_alimony_law/. 
 68 Daniel A. Austin, For Debtor or Worse: Discharge of Marital Debt Obligations under the Bankruptcy 
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 1369, 1374 (2005).  
 69 Id. at 1374–75. 
 70 See Samuel Stebbins, How Much Does It Cost to Get a Divorce? 10 States with the Highest Price Tags, 
USA TODAY, (Nov. 26, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2018/11/26/how-much-does-cost-get-
divorce-most-expensive-states/38446243/. 
 71 Id.  
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with a tremendous amount of debt post-divorce along with newly mandated 
support obligations leaving bankruptcy as the only viable option.72 Bankruptcy 
and divorce overlap when a debtor seeks to discharge obligations arising from a 
divorce decree.73 This intersection has led to considerable litigation74 and 
overpayments of support obligations are no exception. 
B. Defining Domestic Support Obligation and Understanding How Its 
Definition Affects Overpayments 
A DSO is defined in § 101(14A) of the Code.75 The broad statutory language 
listed in §101(14A) was added by the 2005 BAPCPA amendments76 and has 
since been an area of much debate amongst bankruptcy courts in the United 
States.77 A DSO is defined as: 
[A] debt that accrues before, on, or after the date of the order for relief 
in a case under this title, including interest that accrues on that debt as 
provided under applicable non-bankruptcy law notwithstanding any 
other provision of this title, that is-- 
(A) owed to or recoverable by-- 
(i) a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor or such 
child’s parent, legal guardian, or responsible relative; or 
(ii) a governmental unit; 
(B) in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support (including 
assistance provided by a governmental unit) of such spouse, former 
spouse, or child of the debtor or such child’s parent, without regard to 
whether such debt is expressly so designated; 
(C) established or subject to establishment before, on, or after 
the date of the order for relief in a case under this title, by reason of 
applicable provisions of-- 
(i) a separation agreement, divorce decree, or property 
settlement agreement; 
(ii) an order of a court of record; or 
(iii) a determination made in accordance with applicable 
non-bankruptcy law by a governmental unit; and 
(D) not assigned to a nongovernmental entity, unless that 
obligation is assigned voluntarily by the spouse, former spouse, child 
 
 72 See Austin, supra note 68, at 1375. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. 
 75 11 U.S.C. §101(14A) (2019). 
 76 See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention & Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, §801(a), 
119 Stat. 23, 141 (2005). 
 77 Compare Kassicieh v. Mascotti, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 4494 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007), with Galiardo v. 
Galiardo (In re Galiardo), 526 B.R. 897, 900 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2013). 
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of the debtor, or such child’s parent, legal guardian, or responsible 
relative for the purpose of collecting the debt.78 
Most relevant to an overpaid DSO debt is whether the overpayment falls 
within the language listed in section (B).79 When examining this provision, 
courts are split on when and why DSOs stop functioning as means of support.80 
Bankruptcy courts must understand how the overpaid DSO functions between 
the parties and how the family originally construed it to determine if the debt fits 
this provision.81 In deciphering how the overpaid DSO functions, a factor test is 
created.82 The “courts look at many factors focusing on (1) the language and 
substance of the agreement; (2) the financial situation of the parties at the time 
of the agreement, including prospects for future income; and (3) the function 
served by the obligation at the time of the agreement.”83 Some courts embrace 
the third criteria of the factor test when determining if a debt is a DSO.84 These 
courts find overpaid support debts to fit within the definition listed in 
§ 101(14A), reasoning that, at the time of the agreement, the debt’s primary 
function was in the nature of support.85 However, many other courts focus on 
the second criteria of the factor test and assess the need for the refund.86 These 
courts commonly render overpaid debts as money judgments and exclude them 
from the definition listed in § 101(14A) because there was no need for the 
refund.87  
Labels attached to provisions in separation agreements do not signify certain 
debts to be in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support.88 Rather, courts 
must look beyond the labels attached to debts when determining if the debt 
retains its character as a DSO as defined by the Code.89 Though labels are not 
conclusive, they may be important in deciphering the intent of the parties 
involved.90 Courts may consider labels, but with much trepidation. DSOs have 
 
 78 11 U.S.C. §101(14A) (2019). 
 79 See Holiday, supra note 4, at 439. 
 80 See In re Norbut, 387 B.R. 199, 210 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2008); Allen Co. Child Enf’t Agency v. Baker 
(In re Baker), 294 B.R. 281 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2002); Lankford v. Drinkard (In re Drinkard), 245 B.R. 91, 93 
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2000). 
 81 See Diane Brazen Gordon, Feature: Marital Debt Disputes in Chapter 13: Is the Debt a DSO?, 33-3 
ABIJ 60, 61 (2014). 
 82 Id.; see also Sampson v. Sampson (In re Sampson), 997 F.2d 717, 723–26 (10th Cir. 1993). 
 83 Gordon, supra note 81, at 61; see also In re Sampson, 997 F.2d at 723–26. 
 84 See In re Baker, 294 B.R. 281. 
 85 See id. 
 86 See In re Vanhook, 426 B.R. 296 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2010). 
 87 See id. 
 88 See Holiday, supra note 4, at 439. 
 89 Taylor v. Taylor (In re Taylor), 737 F.3d 670, 676–77 (10th Cir. 2013). 
 90 See Holiday, supra note 4, at 439. 
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a powerful influence on personal bankruptcy proceedings because they are 
constantly referenced throughout the Code. Therefore, courts must tread 
carefully when the status of a familial debt is uncertain.91 
C. Why Overpayments of DSOs Occur and Its Significance in Bankruptcy  
Because support obligations are interwoven into divorce proceedings, 
overpayments may emerge as a consequence.92 Overpayments stem from a 
variety of circumstances including failing to timely end a wage garnishment,93 
paying child support for children who are later found not to be biologically 
related to the support provider,94 or unknowingly providing payments that are 
no longer court ordered.95 Most frequently, overpayments occur because 
litigation concerning these obligations persists while the payments are court 
ordered.96 At the end of litigation, many state courts retroactively terminate 
support obligations as deemed necessary in order to rightfully return outstanding 
funds.97 Outside of bankruptcy, these overpayments would be ordered to be paid 
back in full to the original support provider.  
Within bankruptcy, courts are split on whether these payments are in the 
nature of support as a DSO.98 Labeling this debt as a DSO determines whether 
the creditor should be paid back and if so, to what extent. Throughout the Code, 
familial obligations are afforded much significance.99 However, overpaid 
support debts are not mentioned at all.100 This gap has caused much 
consternation among bankruptcy courts because there is no clear answer on how 
to address these types of obligations. Support obligations are vital tools in our 
society, and we want to encourage individuals to pay these debts. Problems arise 
from these fluctuating decisions because if an individual believes his or her 
former spouse is financially distressed, he or she may stop providing support 
obligations if the jurisdiction does not reimburse creditors for overpaid support 
debts in bankruptcy proceedings. 
 
 91 See In re Norbut, 387 B.R. 199, 210 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2008). 
 92 See In re Vanhook, 426 B.R. 296; In re Norbut, 387 B.R. at 210; Allen Co. Child Enf’t Agency v. 
Baker (In re Baker), 294 B.R. 281 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2002); Lankford v. Drinkard (In re Drinkard), 245 B.R. 
91, 93 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2000). 
 93 See In re Baker, 294 B.R. 281. 
 94 See In re Vanhook, 426 B.R. 296. 
 95 See Galiardo v. Galiardo (In re Galiardo), 526 B.R. 897, 899 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2013). 
 96 See In re Norbut, 387 B.R. at 210; In re Baker, 294 B.R. 281. 
 97 See id. 
 98 See In re Norbut, 387 B.R. at 210; In re Baker, 294 B.R. 281; Lankford v. Drinkard (In re Drinkard), 
245 B.R. 91, 93 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2000). 
 99 See 11 U.S.C. §507(a)(1)(A) (2019).  
 100 See generally 11 U.S.C. (2019). 
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D. Domestic Support Obligations Within the Bankruptcy Code  
DSOs are given special treatment and receive much attention throughout the 
Code.101 Specifically, DSOs are (1) given first priority102 for repayment from the 
estate and (2) listed as an express exception to discharge in chapters 7 and 13.103 
These provisions direct courts on how to treat DSOs themselves, but lack 
guidelines for overpayments of these same support obligations.104 How these 
provisions function and how courts have construed them in connection with 
overpaid support debts is pertinent in understanding why a standard set of 
guidelines is needed.  
1. Domestic Support Obligations Listed as a Priority under 11 U.S.C. 
§ 507 
Priority claims play a significant role in bankruptcy proceedings. When 
drafting the Code, Congress dictated that an unsecured105 priority claim will 
receive special treatment.106 If the debtor’s estate produces distributable funds, 
priority claims will be paid before other unsecured nonpriority claims.107 Prior 
to the introduction of the 1994 amendments, domestic support obligations were 
deemed nondischargeable but retained no priority status.108 After the 1994 
amendments, DSOs were given seventh priority out of a list of nine.109 This 
elevation resulted in DSOs being treated more stringently in bankruptcy 
proceedings and reduced the chances that the claim would be subject to 
preference attacks if it were categorized as a general unsecured claim.110 
In 2005, BAPCPA radically changed a DSO’s position in § 507’s list of 
priorities.111 Priority status is now distinguished among ten categories with 
descending levels of priority. Congress elevated the position of DSOs from 
seventh priority to first priority.112 This revision has resulted in larger payouts 
 
 101 See 1 COLLIER FAMILY LAW AND THE BANKRUPTCY CODE ¶ 3.02 (16th ed. 2018). 
 102 See 11 U.S.C. §507(a)(1)(A) (2019). 
 103 See 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(5) (2019). 
 104 See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 507, §523. 
 105 Unsecured meaning that there is claim against the property.  
 106 See 11 U.S.C. §507 (2019). 
 107 Id. 
 108 See Lynne F. Riley, BAPCPA at Ten: Enhanced Domestic Creditor Protections and Enforcement 
Rights, 90 AM. BANKR. L.J. 267, 271 (2016).  
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. 
 111 See 11 U.S.C. §507 (2019). 
 112 See 1 COLLIER FAMILY LAW AND THE BANKRUPTCY CODE ¶ 3.02 (16th ed. 2018); see 11 U.S.C. 
§507(a)(1)(A) (2019). 
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on DSO claims in various chapters within the Code.113 This distinction proves 
Congress’s intent that pressing familial matters outweigh the debtor’s fresh start 
and the interests of other creditors.  
2. Exceptions to Discharge Under 11 U.S.C. § 523 
A main objective of the Code is to provide the debtor with a fresh start. 
Congress crafted § 523114 of the Code to balance the debtor’s fresh start with the 
rights of creditors by designating a list of claims that are deemed to be 
nondischargeable.115 Obligations in the nature of support have been excepted 
from discharge since the Code’s enactment in 1978.116 When rendering support 
obligations excepted from discharge, courts must be provided with independent 
findings supporting the proposition that the debt is in the nature of alimony, 
maintenance, or support.117 In a judicial proceeding, the party who seeks to have 
the debt deemed nondischargeable bears the burden of proof under 
§ 523(a)(5).118 
Bankruptcy courts consider the totality of the circumstances when 
determining if a debt is in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support. The 
language of section § 523(a)(5) simply states “A discharge under [§] 727, 1141, 
1192, 1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b) of this title does not discharge an individual 
debtor from any debt for a domestic support obligation.”119 Bankruptcy courts 
have understood this language to include various expenses surrounding the 
DSO.120 Some expenses that courts have deemed nondischargeable under 
§ 523(a)(5) include mortgage payments, attorneys fees, psychologist, and 
accountant fees.121 What is considered to be in the nature of alimony, 
maintenance, or support is far-reaching and construed broadly by courts.122  
Many debts that appear to be DSOs are not always excepted from discharge 
under § 523(a)(5). These debts are not always excepted from discharge because 
the presiding court has discretion in what is considered to be a DSO. If 
 
 113 See 1 COLLIER FAMILY LAW AND THE BANKRUPTCY CODE ¶ 3.02 (16th ed. 2018). 
 114 See 11 U.S.C. §523 (2019). 
 115 See id.  
 116 See Riley, supra note 108, at 293.  
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. 
 119 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (2019); see also 11 U.S.C. § 101(14)(A) (2019) for the full definition of a 
domestic support obligation. 
 120 See Riley, supra note 108, at 294295.  
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. 
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§ 523(a)(5) is deemed inapplicable to a related debt, § 523(a)(15) may apply.123 
The BAPCPA amendments reconstructed § 523(a)(15) to provide a safety net 
for these related debts.124 The former version of § 523(a)(15), added to the Code 
in 1994, required the non-debtor to file an adversary proceeding to prove the 
debtor was able to pay the obligation and show that the detriment to the plaintiff 
outweighed the debtor’s right to a discharge.125 Because courts commonly found 
that the debtor was unable to pay, these assertions were routinely defeated.126 In 
2005, BAPCPA eliminated this process and instead stated that a debt was 
nondischargeable if it is owing: 
[T]o a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor and not the kind 
described in paragraph (5) that is incurred by the debtor in the course 
of a divorce or separation or in connection with a separation 
agreement, divorce decree or other order of a court of record, or a 
determination made in accordance with State or territorial law by a 
governmental unit.127 
Recent caselaw has construed § 523(a)(15) broadly to include debt divisions, 
mortgages, car payments, and other nonsupport marital dissolution matters.128 
Section 523(a)(15) is expansive; hence, overpayments of DSOs should easily 
fall within the parameters of its terms. If a familial debt is “in connection with a 
separation agreement, divorce decree, or other order of a court of record,” the 
debt will be excepted from discharge.129 Because of the language that Congress 
included in §§ 523(a)(5) and 523(a)(15), all overpayments of DSOs should be 
excepted from discharge.130 
3. Lack of Guidance from the Code on How to Construe an Overpaid DSO  
The Code does not provide a definition for the term “overpayment.”131 
Because of this omission, case law is the only area of guidance dictating how 
overpayments of particular debts should be construed.132 In dealing with 
overpayments of DSOs, the case law varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 
 
 123 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15) (2019). 
 124 See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 523, 
119 Stat. 23 (2005). 
 125 See Riley, supra note 108, at 295.  
 126 Id. 
 127 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15) (2019). 
 128 See Riley, supra note 108, at 296. 
 129 § 523(a)(15). 
 130 § 523(a)(15) does not apply in Chapter 13 cases.  
 131 See 11 U.S.C. § 101 (2019) (listing definitions used within the Code).  
 132 See generally 11 U.S.C. (2019). 
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Some courts follow the principle of reimbursement.133 These courts look to the 
current function of the debt between the debtor and the creditor and thus, these 
courts construe overpayment of a domestic support obligation as a simple money 
judgment. This approach results in a pro-debtor outcome.134 In contrast, other 
courts look to “the function served by the obligation at the time of the divorce” 
for guidance when deciding if the debt falls within the nature of support.135 
These courts find that an overpaid DSO still retains its character as a DSO at the 
time the creditor has filed his or her proof of claim.136 This approach results in a 
pro-creditor outcome. In order to remedy this discrepancy and respect family 
law values, bankruptcy courts need to follow a uniform set of standards. 
II. ARGUMENT: CREATING A NEW SET OF STANDARDS 
All DSOs should be excepted from discharge. In addition, the overpayment 
of child support should be entitled to priority status whereas the overpayment of 
alimony should not. Exceptions to these standards arise when confronted with 
extreme circumstances. These standards emerge after (1) analyzing the 
jurisdictional split, (2) understanding Congress’s intent in drafting the Code, (3) 
unpacking the substance of the obligation, and (4) deciphering the intent and 
current condition of the parties.  
A. Addressing the Jurisdictional Split  
Overpayments of DSOs present a gray area within the Code that causes 
courts to be divided on the issue. Debts that do not fit squarely within the 
definition listed in § 101(14A) give rise to contentious judicial proceedings. “A 
properly filed claim is presumed valid and is prima facie evidence of its own 
validity and amount.”137 The presumption is rebuttable, but it is up to the 
objecting individual to provide evidence to overcome the claim.138 Once the 
party opposing the debt produces a basis for questioning the validity of the claim, 
the burden shifts to the initial claimant.139 As a general rule, a party seeking to 
except a debt from discharge or gain priority status bears the burden of proof 
and must establish each element of his or her claim by a preponderance of the 
 
 133 See Lankford v. Drinkard (In re Drinkard), 245 B.R. 91, 93 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2000). 
 134 Id. at 94. 
 135 See Sampson v. Sampson (In re Sampson), 997 F.2d 717, 725 (10th Cir. 1993) (internal citation 
omitted). 
 136 Id. 
 137 In re Alewelt, 520 B.R. 704, 708 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2014) (emphasis in original). 
 138 See In re Vanhook, 426 B.R. 296, 298–99 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2010). 
 139 See In re Alewelt, 520 B.R. at 708. 
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evidence.140 It is the creditor who must prove that the debt at issue is entitled to 
be excepted from discharge or is entitled to priority status.141 Due to the gap in 
the Code and the discontinuity in existing case law, the amount of 
reimbursement that overpaid support creditors will receive varies from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The language BAPCPA added to the Code is not 
unclear. Rather, the drafters did not anticipate the issue of overpaid DSOs. In 
order to preserve the uniform application intended by the Code, the discrepancy 
in the Code pertaining to the overpayments of DSOs must be ameliorated. 
The jurisdictional split does not openly address the difference between 
priority status and an exception to discharge. This distinction is significant 
because each represents an isolated concept within the Code. This section 
considers how the jurisdictional split addresses (1) priority status and (2) 
exception to discharge. An inquiry into a support debt entails the same analysis 
for both priority status and exception to discharge, but different results are 
produced for both the creditor and the debtor. Priority status results in the 
support creditor receiving his or her funds before other creditors whereas 
exception to discharge means that the debtor may never forgo paying the 
particular support debt.142 The question at stake for both inquiries is whether the 
debt is in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support, and is thus a DSO.143 
When a debt is considered a DSO, it is both excepted from discharge144 and 
entitled to first priority status.145 When BAPCPA amended § 523(a)(15), some 
courts relied on this provision to except an overpaid support obligation from 
discharge rather than labeling the obligation itself as a DSO. Because of the 
newly amended section,146 some courts chose not to consider the priority status 
of overpaid support debts because only debts clearly labeled as DSOs are entitled 
to priority status.147 How each court construes what overpayments of support 
obligations encompass greatly impacts both the creditor and the debtor 
throughout a bankruptcy proceeding.  
 
 140 See Martin v. Pelley (In re Pelley), Nos. 17-10007-BAH, 17-1011-BAH, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 3254 
(Bankr. D.N.H. Sept. 26, 2017). 
 141 See id. 
 142 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(5), 507(a)(1)(A) (2019). 
 143 See 11 U.S.C. § 101(14)(A) (2019).  
 144 See § 523(a)(5). 
 145 See § 507(a)(1)(A).  
 146 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15) (2019). 
 147 See generally 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1)(A) (2019). 
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1. Priority Status Under Section 507(a) 
On one side of the split, courts have ruled that overpaid domestic support 
obligations are not DSOs at all and therefore are not entitled to priority status 
under § 507(a)(1)(A).148 These courts emphasize the current application of the 
debt.149 In other words, at the time the creditor demands to be reimbursed, the 
debt is not considered a DSO if there is no current need for the support.150 The 
debt is instead viewed as a money judgment that does not fall within the 
definition listed in § 101(14A).151 For these reasons, courts will not find 
wrongfully paid DSOs within the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support 
and therefore these courts deny such claims priority status. 
In In re Alewelt, a claim for maintenance reimbursement was at issue before 
the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of Illinois.152 Mr. 
Hardin and the debtor were legally divorced in January 2010.153 The state court 
ordered that Mr. Hardin would have custody of their one minor child but was 
obligated to pay debtor $500 a month in spousal support.154 The state court then 
deducted sixty-eight dollars from Mr. Hardin’s maintenance payment for child 
support he was receiving.155 In March 2013, the state court retroactively 
terminated the maintenance award as of June 1, 2011, because the debtor was 
cohabitating with a new boyfriend.156 The court concluded that debtor owed Mr. 
Hardin $42,953.86 in maintenance reimbursements.157 After further calculation, 
the court found $6,384 worth of child support arrearage through March 2013, 
and $12,624 through March 2014.158 On March 31, 2014 the debtor filed for 
 
 148 See, e.g., Martin v. Pelley (In re Pelley), Nos. 17-10007-BAH, 17-1011-BAH, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 
3254 (Bankr. D.N.H. Sept. 26, 2017); Taylor v. Taylor (In re Taylor), 478 B.R. 419 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2012); 
Vaughn v. Reid-Hayden (In re Reid-Hayden), 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 980 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 22, 2011); In re 
Vanhook, 426 B.R. 296 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2010); Lankford v. Drinkard (In re Drinkard), 245 B.R. 91 (Bankr. 
N.D. Tex. 2000); In re Lutzke, 223 B.R. 552 (Bankr. D. Or. 1998). 
 149 See In re Vanhook, 426 B.R. at 301. 
 150 See In re Alewelt, 520 B.R. 704, 712 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2014) (“An established need for support is a key 
factor in determining whether an obligation is in the nature of support.”). 
 151 See id. 
 152 Id. at 706. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Id. (in addition to a percentage of Mr. Hardin’s overtime income). 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. 
 157 Id. at 707. 
 158 Id. at 706707. In 2014, the court also concluded that $42,953.86 was due to Mr. Hardin for 
maintenance payments. Overall, there was $55,577.86 due to Mr. Hardin for support purposes.  
NOWAK_7.15.20 7/15/2020 2:08 PM 
528 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 36 
chapter 13 relief and Mr. Hardin timely filed a proof of claim asserting the full 
amount159 as entitled to priority status as a domestic support obligation.160 
The bankruptcy court determined that Mr. Hardin’s claim was not entitled 
to priority status.161 In reaching this conclusion, the court recognized Mr. 
Hardin’s “original obligation” as one in the nature of support.162 Instead of 
honoring the character of the original obligation, the court questioned what the 
purpose of the debt was as it stood at issue before the court.163 In analyzing the 
debt, the court acknowledged the jurisdictional split and noted that there is “no 
per se rule.”164 Because Mr. Hardin did not present sufficient evidence proving 
his current need for the funds, the court determined the debt was not a DSO and 
therefore not entitled to priority status.165 
Many bankruptcy courts have agreed with the reasoning set forth in In re 
Alewelt.166 Denying creditors priority status for overpaid DSOs leaves these 
creditors without recourse. This outcome allows debtors to avoid paying the full 
amount of reimbursement for support obligations ordered by state courts by 
simply filing for bankruptcy.167 In turn, the creditor’s claim is treated as a 
general unsecured claim, and if lucky, the creditor will receive just a small 
portion of the total amount due and owing to him or her. Because of the financial 
distress these debtor’s face post-divorce, there is a higher percentage of no asset 
cases or the creation of low payment plans making claim reimbursement even 
more difficult. Even though both courts and the Code have concluded that 
 
 159 The full amount owed to Mr. Hardin totaled to $55,577.86. Id. at 707. 
 160 Id. 
 161 Id. at 710. 
 162 Id. at 711. 
 163 Id. 
 164 Id. (emphasis in original). 
 165 Id. at 712 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2014). 
 166 See Martin v. Pelley (In re Pelley), Nos. 17-10007-BAH, 17-1011-BAH, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 3254 
(Bankr. D.N.H. Sept. 26, 2017); Taylor v. Taylor (In re Taylor), 478 B.R. 419 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2012); Vaughn 
v. Reid-Hayden (In re Reid-Hayden), 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 980 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 22, 2011); In re Vanhook, 426 
B.R. 296 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2010); Lankford v. Drinkard (In re Drinkard), 245 B.R. 91 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2000); 
In re Lutzke, 223 B.R. 552 (Bankr. D. Or. 1998). 
 167 See In re Alewelt, 520 B.R. at 712. 
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enforcement of familial support obligations outweigh the debtor’s fresh start,168 
it seems that rulings similar to In re Alewelt undermine that principle.169  
In addition to the immediate consequences arising when courts deny 
wrongfully paid support obligations priority status, there are also long-standing 
implications. If an overpayment is not treated as a DSO, this poses serious 
societal concerns. This view may cause support providers to pay closer attention 
to the intricacies of their initial support obligations and contest payments on the 
basis of fear of overpayment. If a support provider suspects that his or her ex-
spouse is on the verge of filing for bankruptcy, this may trigger the support 
provider to discontinue payments of support. These rulings present a slippery 
slope; contrary to society’s construction, many individuals may begin to 
disregard and neglect familial support obligations. When this occurs, greater 
problems will surface affecting more than just the creditor and the debtor. They 
will affect individual family units and society as a whole.  
In contrast to In re Alewelt and similar decisions, a few courts have ruled 
that wrongfully paid support obligations are DSOs and therefore are entitled to 
priority status under § 507(a).170 These courts acknowledge that “one of the 
consistent underlying themes of [the Code] is to accord great deference to 
familial obligations.”171 Furthermore, the perception that support obligations in 
the Code clearly outweigh the debtor’s fresh start is reiterated and emphasized 
through these court opinions.172 While explaining why priority is afforded to 
these debts, courts recognize that “principles of federalism require that in matters 
that are traditionally reserved to state courts, any doubt[s] as to a statute[‘s] 
interpretation are to be resolved in favor of not interfering with state court 
matters.”173 These principles and ideologies emulate the idea that when dealing 
with wrongfully paid familial obligations, the interest of creditors must be 
 
 168 See In re Taylor, 737 F.3d at 675. 
Two provisions of the Bankruptcy Code except from discharge debts arising out of obligations to 
the family: § 523(a)(5) excepts from discharge any “domestic support obligation,” as defined in 
the Bankruptcy Code; and § 523(a)(15) excepts from discharge obligations arising in connection 
with a divorce proceeding or settlement agreement. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5), (15). “These 
provisions reflect the congressional preference for the rights of spouses to alimony, maintenance 
or support over the rights of debtors to a ‘fresh start’ free of debts.” (internal citation omitted). 
 169 See In re Alewelt, 520 B.R. 704. 
 170 See, e.g., Kerr v. Meadors (In re Knott), 482 B.R. 852 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2012); In re Norbut, 387 B.R. 
199 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2008); Allen Co. Child Enf’t Agency v. Baker (In re Baker), 294 B.R. 281 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ohio 2002). 
 171 In re Norbut, 387 B.R. at 210. 
 172 See id. 
 173 Id. 
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construed broadly and bankruptcy court decisions must not contradict state court 
matters.174 Priority status is afforded to these debts because courts conclude that 
the debt retained its supportive nature based on the initial obligation.175 
A select number of courts consider overpaid DSOs to be in the nature of 
alimony, maintenance, or support. In the Northern District of Georgia, Helen 
Jean Knott (Knott) filed a petition for chapter 7 relief.176 Knott’s former 
husband, William Meadors, filed a proof of claim for $41,581.79 arising from a 
state court judgment ordering Knott to repay him for overpaid child support.177 
Mr. Meadors categorized the debt as a DSO entitled to priority under 
§ 507(a)(1)(A).178 Knott objected, arguing that the overpayment of child support 
did not retain its character as a DSO because the debt was not current.179 The 
court analyzed the definition of a DSO in the Code and found the debt to be in 
the nature of support because the purpose of the initial payment was for the 
support of the children and therefore, the court categorized the claim as a DSO 
entitled to priority status.180 Hence, certain jurisdictions will allow overpaid 
support debts to fall within the definition of a DSO.  
Courts deciding in accordance with In re Knott follow a backward-looking 
approach when confronted with overpaid support obligations.181 Most of these 
courts outwardly reject the decisions of alternate courts that deny overpaid 
support obligations priority status.182 In In re Baker, where an overpayment of 
child support was at issue, the court stated, “the particular attention the above 
decisions pay to the ‘need’ of the parent-creditor does not find support in the 
statute.”183 The court in In re Baker continued to explain “it is noted that had 
Congress wanted a court to take into account factors such as ‘need’ and/or a 
disparity in the parties’ income, it certainty knew how to make its wishes 
known[.]”184 The nature of support language that Congress includes in 
§ 101(14A) when defining a DSO is different than the “need” of support.185 
Since these courts rule out the requirement for “need” of support, the 
 
 174 See id. 
 175 See In re Baker, 294 B.R. at 288. 
 176 Kerr v. Meadors (In re Knott), 482 B.R. 852, 853 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2012). 
 177 Id.  
 178 See id.  
 179 Id. at 853–54. 
 180 See id. at 856. 
 181 See, e.g., Allen Co. Child Enf’t Agency v. Baker (In re Baker), 294 B.R. 281 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2002). 
 182 See id. at 287. 
 183 See id. at 287 (referring to the decisions of In re Lutzke, 223 B.R. 552 (Bankr. D. Or. 1998) and 
Lankford v. Drinkard (In re Drinkard), 245 B.R. 91 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2000)).  
 184 In re Baker, 294 B.R. at 287. 
 185 See Kassicieh v. Mascotti, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 4494 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007). 
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overpayment is assessed based on the function the obligation served at the time 
the agreement was created.186 
A prominent and consistent underlying theme of bankruptcy law is to afford 
familial obligations a substantial amount of deference.187 By doing so, courts 
conclude that it would be counterintuitive to deny priority status to 
overpayments of support obligations by defining them as money judgments.188 
The Code acknowledges the importance of the family unit and its stability as a 
highly regarded concept in our society.189 Courts reinforce this underlying 
concept when they afford priority status to overpaid support debts in bankruptcy 
proceedings. 
Short term implications of affording overpaid support obligations priority 
status arise in connection to the debtor’s fresh start. A fundamental goal of the 
Code is to provide debtors with this notion of a fresh start.190 That is, the debtor 
is freed from any personal liabilities owed to creditors.191 A debtor’s fresh start 
is achieved through discharge192 and the more debts a debtor incurs, the further 
he or she is from discharge. Although familial obligations are held in high 
regard, it is possible that stretching the definition of a DSO to include an 
overpaid support debt is too broad of an interpretation.193 When courts label 
these overpayments as money judgments, they safeguard a debtor under the 
Code and protect the principle of the fresh start.  
On the opposite end of the spectrum, these decisions are arguably necessary 
to keep familial obligations in high regard. If bankruptcy courts grant deference 
to state court decisions it will promote a stable judicial environment. When 
judicial decisions are respected amongst state and federal levels, family 
members will be more likely to abide by their support obligations because there 
will be a clear demarcation of what law families must follow. Hence, if an 
individual is aware that there is no way to avoid a child support or alimony 
payment, it is more likely that he or she will eventually provide that payment. 
Moreover, the judicial branch in upholding the importance of family obligations 
 
 186 Sampson v. Sampson (In re Sampson), 997 F.2d 717, 723–26 (10th Cir. 1993). 
 187 See, e.g., In re Baker, 294 B.R. at 287–88. 
 188 See, e.g., In re Norbut, 387 B.R. 199, 211 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2008). 
 189 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 523, 507 (2019). 
 190 See Process–Bankruptcy Basics, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/ 
bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/process-bankruptcy-basics (last visited Oct. 27, 2018) (discussing a case from 
1934 stating “it gives to the honest but unfortunate debtor . . . a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future 
effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt.”).  
 191 See id. 
 192 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 727, 1328 (2019). 
 193 See In re Vanhook, 426 B.R. 296, 301 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2010). 
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will shed a great amount of influence onto individuals who are confronted with 
these obligations.  
2. Exceptions to Discharge Under Section 523(a)(5) and (a)(15) 
The jurisdictional split becomes vastly complicated when courts consider 
exceptions to discharge. Because BAPCPA revised § 523(a)(15) of the Code, 
many courts have overlooked the possibility of an overpaid support debt existing 
as a DSO. Section 523(a)(15) provides that, in order to be excepted from 
discharge in chapter 7 cases, the debt in question has to be connected to a divorce 
decree.194 With this provision intact, whether the overpayment of a support 
obligation is a DSO becomes an unnecessary analysis that many courts do not 
even consider. However, the application of § 523(a)(15) is conditional to chapter 
7 cases and creates a loophole for chapter 13 cases.195 If courts do not construe 
overpaid support obligations as DSOs, then these debts may be discharged in 
chapter 13 proceedings.196 
Courts that determine an overpaid DSO is not excepted from discharge under 
11 U.S.C. § 523 follow the same reasoning of courts who deny priority status 
for these debts. Once again, these courts focus on the current need of the DSO 
creditor.197 Most creditors who seek a reimbursement from an overpaid DSO do 
not have the “need” for support. Because of this factor, many courts have 
decided that these debts cannot be excepted from discharge.198 Cases concerning 
DSOs are predominately dealt with in chapter 7 and chapter 13. With this in 
mind, the Code notes in § 1328(a)(2) that debts falling within § 523(a)(15) are 
dischargeable in a chapter 13 case.199 This gap in the Code allows debtors to 
avoid paying certain debts, such as overpaid DSOs, because if the jurisdiction 
does not consider wrongfully paid support obligations DSOs themselves, then 
debtors will be able to escape that debt.200 This loophole is an area in the Code 
the can be easily abused when overpaid support obligations are present.  
 
 194 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15) (2019). 
 195 See id.  
 196 See generally id.  
 197 See Martin v. Pelley (In re Pelley), No. 17-10007-BAH, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 3254, at *11–12 (Bankr. 
D.N.H. Sept. 26, 2017); Galiardo v. Galiardo (In re Galiardo), 526 B.R. 897, 898 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2013). 
 198 See In re Pelley, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 3254, at *11–12; In re Galiardo, 526 B.R. at 898. 
 199 See 11 U.S.C § 1328(a)(2) (2019) (“[T]he court shall grant the debtor a discharge of all debts provided 
for by the plan or disallowed under § 502 of this title, except any debt . . . of the kind specified in [§] 507(a)(8)(C) 
[11 USCS § 507(a)(8)(C)] or in paragraph (1)(B), (1)(C), (2), (3), (4), (5), (8), or (9) of [§] 523(a) [11 USCS 
§ 523(a)]”). 
 200 See In re Galiardo, 526 B.R. at 899–900 (explaining that § 523(a)(15) does not apply to the facts of 
the case because the debtor converted her case from a chapter 7 to a chapter 13 and the debt in question does not 
fall within the definition of a DSO).  
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In In re Taylor, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Tenth Circuit (BAP), 
determined that an overpaid support obligation was nondischargeable pursuant 
to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15).201 The debtor appealed arguing in her brief that 
Congress intended a different result from the plain language of the statute.202 
The BAP rejected her approach and instead stated, “there is no indication that 
congressional concern extended to the protection of a debtor-dependent spouse 
who may be responsible for repayment of wrongfully paid spousal support.”203 
Bankruptcy is not a forum where a debtor can avoid alimony and child support 
payments.204 The Tenth Circuit affirmed the BAP’s ruling supporting the 
proposition that the overpayment of spousal support is nondischargeable in a 
chapter 7 case under § 523 (a)(15).205 In affirming the BAP’s ruling, the Tenth 
Circuit reiterated that the debt does not fall under the definition of a DSO and 
therefore is not nondischargeable under § 523(a)(5).206 Due to this distinction, if 
the debtor filed for relief under chapter 13, the debt would be dischargeable.  
In In re Galiardo, the court held that an overpaid support debt was 
nondischargeable.207 In this case, the debtor initially filed for chapter 7 relief and 
owed her ex-spouse over $200,000 in excess alimony payments.208 The debtor 
converted her case to chapter 13 soon after the debtor’s ex-spouse filed an 
adversary proceeding against her.209 Once the debtor converted the case to a 
chapter 13 case the bankruptcy court deemed the overpaid alimony debt 
dischargeable, leaving the debtor’s ex-spouse unable to recover the debt.210 The 
court concluded that, due to a lack of need by the debtor’s ex-spouse, the debt 
was not in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support and thus the debt was 
dischargeable under § 523(a)(5).211 This decision undermines the fundamental 
principle of bankruptcy law that bankruptcy is not a forum where an individual 
can escape support payments.212 
Exceptions to discharge become convoluted and disordered when courts are 
confronted with overpaid support debts. As seen in In re Galiardo, overpaid 
 
 201 See Taylor v. Taylor (In re Taylor), 737 F.3d 670, 673 (10th Cir. 2013). 
 202 See id. at 681. (citing Robbins v. Chronister, 435 F.3d 1238, 1241 (10th Cir. 2006)). 
 203 See id. 
 204 See id. 
 205 See id. at 682. 
 206 See id. at 676–77. 
 207 See Galiardo v. Galiardo (In re Galiardo), 526 B.R. 897 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2013). 
 208 See id. at 898. 
 209 See id. at 899. 
 210 See id. at 902. 
 211 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (2019); In re Galiardo, 526 B.R. at 899–900. 
 212 See H.R. Rep. No. 103-835, at 32, 54–55 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3342, 3363–
64. 
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support obligations can amount to a large sum of money.213 The Code should 
not allow access to loopholes for individuals trying to avoid support obligations. 
However, the application of § 523(a)(15) is conditional to chapter 7 cases, 
therefore the Code inadvertently creates this loophole with regard to overpaid 
support debts. Debtors can specifically file for chapter 13 or convert their cases 
to chapter 13 to avoid this obligation.214 Hence, the distinction between priority 
debts and non-priority debts is critical. The only ways to remedy the issue are 
(1) for Congress to apply § 523(a)(15) to chapter 13 cases or (2) for courts to 
construe overpaid support debts as DSOs under § 523(a)(5) and § 507(a)(1)(A). 
Furthermore, when bankruptcy courts base overpaid support obligations on 
current need, it defeats the purpose of the divorce decree and goes against the 
authority of state courts. State courts consider a multitude of factors when they 
determine support obligations.215 After much analysis and consideration, these 
courts comprise their findings into a divorce decree.216 The divorce decree is a 
highly regarded document that dictates how a family will continue to function 
after a legal separation.217 Within the decree are support obligations that state 
courts deem necessary. Because financial issues commonly arise between ex-
spouses and ex-partners, overpayments occur, and state courts must order the 
overpaid amount to be returned to the provider. By allowing debtors to avoid 
repaying overpaid DSOs, bankruptcy courts are undermining state court 
decisions.218 Bankruptcy courts must respect state court decisions concerning 
domestic relations within their proceedings. 
Some courts deem overpaid support debts nondischargeable under 
§ 523(a)(5).219 These courts follow the rationale that “[t]he critical question in 
determining whether the obligation is, in substance, support is the function 
served by the obligation at the time of the divorce [decree].”220 This notion 
allows courts to except overpaid support debts from discharge in both chapter 7 
and chapter 13 cases. These courts align themselves closely with the state court’s 
findings. In doing so, these courts are respecting the intentions of the drafters of 
 
 213 See In re Galiardo, 526 B.R. at 899 (noting that the debtor owed her ex-spouse $222,650.00).  
 214 See id. at 898. 
 215 See generally 3 FAMILY LAW AND PRACTICE § 33.05 (2018), Lexis (database updated November 2019). 
 216 See Johnson, supra note 39, at 95.  
 217 See Johnson, supra note 39, at 95, 97.  
 218 Cf. Norbut v. Norbut (In re Norbut), 387 B.R. 199, 210 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2008). 
 219 See Taylor v. Taylor, 737 F.3d 670 (10th Cir. 2013); Martin v. Pelley (In re Pelley), No. 17-10007-
BAH, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 3254 (Bankr. D.N.H. Sep. 26, 2017).  
 220 See Sampson v. Sampson (In re Sampson), 997 F.2d 717, 725 (10th Cir. 1993) (internal quotation 
omitted).  
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the Code.221 
An example where a court found an overpaid support debt nondischargeable 
under § 523(a)(5) is seen in Kassicieh v. Mascotti.222 The court in this case 
considered an overpaid child support debt in the amount of $28,000 that arose 
from a retroactive reduction.223 The court determined that the overpayments 
“were made pursuant to an order for child support, and as such Kassicieh was 
under a legal duty to make such payments.”224 The court found this legal duty 
was in the nature of support and therefore considered the overpayment a DSO.225 
This court followed the decision from In re Baker,226 which reiterates the notion 
that an overpaid support obligation must be excepted from discharge as a 
DSO.227 Similarly, the court in In re Baker concluded that courts should take a 
broader approach when determining “whether an overpayment of . . . support 
was entitled to favorable treatment under [the Code].”228 
3. The Perpetuation of the Jurisdictional Split 
As illustrated by case law, overpayments of DSOs are handled very 
differently throughout the United States. Because bankruptcy is a matter of 
federal law, there should be a uniform application of its provisions. The 
disconnect between jurisdictions emerges when courts interpret the Code in 
drastically different ways. In order to apply the provisions of the Code uniformly 
and respect the intentions of the drafters, something must change. Since the 2005 
BAPCPA amendments altered the language of § 523(a)(15) to include any debt 
incurred by the debtor in the course of a divorce or in connection with a court 
order,229 all overpayments of DSOs should be excepted from discharge. The best 
way to ensure overpayments of DSOs are excepted from discharge is to 
eliminate the loophole available to debtors who choose to file for chapter 13 
relief. This is important because, as we have seen above, overpayments of 
support obligations can amount to a large sum of money. A debtor should not be 
able to escape this type of debt by simply filing for relief through a different 
chapter.  
 
 221 See infra, Part B. 
 222 See Kassicieh v. Mascotti, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 4494, at *10 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007). 
 223 Id. at 12. 
 224 Id. at 39. 
 225 Id. 
 226 Allen Co. Child Enf’t Agency v. Baker (In re Baker), 294 B.R. 281 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2002). 
 227 Id. at 288. 
 228 See id. 
 229 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15) (2019).  
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In order to understand how courts should handle overpayments of DSOs, 
each support obligation must be considered separately. Child support must be 
separated from alimony because each support obligation carries a different 
amount of weight. As a general matter, when a creditor overpays a DSO, the 
reimbursement of that overpayment should be excepted from discharge. 
Furthermore, when analyzing (1) Congress’s intent in drafting the Code, (2) the 
intent and current condition of the parties, and (3) the substance of the 
obligation, the overpayment of child support should be entitled to priority status 
whereas the overpayment of alimony and maintenance should not. 
B. Congress’s Intent in Drafting the Bankruptcy Code  
The drafters of the Code did not intend for bankruptcy courts to serve as 
domestic relations courts.230 Traditionally, federal courts avoid issues of family 
law because state courts retain expertise on these matters.231 In drafting the 
Code, Congress reiterates this traditional approach in many of its provisions.232 
Bankruptcy courts often declare that res judicata bars litigation of any matter 
that was litigated or had the opportunity to be litigated in state court.233 The 2005 
BAPCPA amendments further solidify Congress’s opinion that family law 
matters are better left to be decided by state courts.234 
The 2005 BAPCPA amendments created and defined the term, “domestic 
support obligation.”235 Congress created this new term to provide more 
protections to support claimants throughout the Code.236 The special treatment 
DSO claimants receive extends to the automatic stay, priorities, exemptions, and 
discharge.237 Not only does the Code reflect Congress’s opinion that issues of 
domestic relations should be left to state courts, but it also reflects the opinion 
that when a DSOs is included in a bankruptcy proceeding, it is the most 
important claim to consider.238 
 
 230 See 1 COLLIER FAMILY LAW AND THE BANKRUPTCY CODE ¶ 5.01 (16th ed. 2018). 
 231 See id.  
 232 See id.  
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 234 See COLLIER, supra note 230, at ¶ 5.01.  
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 236 See id.  
 237 See id.  
 238 See 11 U.S.C. § 507(A)(1)(a) (2019); George L. III Clauer, Domestic Support Obligations in the 
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DSOs are considered to be a super-priority claim.239 Because BAPCPA 
afforded DSOs first priority under § 507,240 these claims rank higher than other 
critical claims.241 Under the Code, DSOs must be paid off before taxes owed to 
the IRS and trustee’s commissions.242 In § 522 of the Code,243 BAPCPA further 
allows trustees to liquidate exempt property for DSO claimants.244 Property that 
a debtor exempts remains liable both during and after a bankruptcy proceeding 
to pay pre-petition DSO debts notwithstanding state exemption laws that state 
the contrary.245 Hence, “[t]he BAPCPA amended bankruptcy code preempts and 
eliminates the normally applicable state law exemptions with regard to pre-
bankruptcy DSO debt for any property exempted in the bankruptcy case.”246 
Additionally, the automatic stay does not stop the collection of DSO claims.247 
Further, § 362(b)(2)(B) notes that the automatic stay does not stay the 
enforcement of DSOs “from property that is not property of the estate[.]”248 
These provisions clearly indicate that when a DSO is present in a bankruptcy 
proceeding Congress denotes it as the most important debt to pay.249 The Code 
designates many provisions to the extreme protection of DSO claims. With this 
in mind, if certain types of overpaid support debts are considered to be DSOs 
within the meaning of the Code, these are just a few of the treatments Congress 
would afford to these claimants. 
Many courts recognize the principles of federalism intertwined within the 
bankruptcy code.250 The Code clearly acknowledges that state laws govern 
domestic relations between husband and wife or parent and child.251 Bankruptcy 
proceedings are a matter of federal law, but state law should be “consulted for 
guidance” when determining whether an obligation falls into a certain provision 
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of the Code.252 “Of equal importance, basic principles of federalism hold that in 
matters which are traditionally reserved to the states—for example, domestic 
relations—any doubt as to a statute’s interpretation should be resolved in favor 
of not interfering in the state court matter.”253 If a state court determined an 
individual overpaid a support debt, that debt would be court-ordered to be 
reimbursed. This division of authority between state courts and federal 
bankruptcy courts explains the jurisdictional split.  
Implications arise for both the debtor and the creditor when bankruptcy 
courts ignore state court decisions ordering support reimbursements. Debtors 
may use bankruptcy as a way to avoid paying state court orders, such as overpaid 
familial obligations. In other words, if a debtor is aware that the jurisdiction they 
reside in refuses to regard overpaid support debts as DSOs, the debtor may 
choose to file for bankruptcy to purposely avoid reimbursement. This negatively 
affects creditors because many times, especially in chapter 7 cases, the debtor 
does not have sufficient funds to repay unsecured creditors.254 Hence, overpaid 
support claimants will oftentimes never see a penny that they overpaid to debtors 
if they are categorized as general unsecured claimants.255 In these scenarios 
where a support obligation is wrongfully paid, the claims of creditors arise 
because of an initial support obligation. Congress did not intend to group these 
claimants with every other general unsecured creditor. This outcome places too 
much power in the hands of the debtor, leaving the creditor at a grave 
disadvantage.  
On the other hand, when bankruptcy courts respect state court decisions, a 
pro-creditor outcome prevails. When wrongfully paid support obligations are 
considered DSOs within the meaning of the Code, debtors are unable to use 
bankruptcy as a way to avoid reimbursements of support obligations. This, in 
turn, forces potential debtors to pay their debts. This is what Congress prefers; 
Congress did not draft the Code to allow debtors to use bankruptcy as a way out 
of dealing with familial hardships. This approach is proven by the many special 
provisions in the Code favoring DSO claimants.256 Unfortunately, when drafting 
the Code, Congress likely did not think about what would result if there were to 
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be overpayment of a support obligation. Courts, instead of utilizing the plain 
meaning in the definition of a DSO, have instead substituted the word “need” 
for “nature” when determining if an overpaid support debt fits within the 
definition.257 The Code’s definition of a DSO does not use the word “need.”258 
Rather, courts must take a step back and look to see if the debt is in the nature 
of support before constructing their own definition contrary to the one listed in 
§ 101(14A).259 When courts recognize that certain overpaid support debts are 
DSOs, creditors will rightfully be afforded all of the privileges listed for DSO 
claimants and reimbursed for their wrongfully overpaid support debts.  
When analyzing the rights of the debtor, DSO claims critically hinder the 
fresh start principle because the Code affords super-priority benefits to DSO 
claimants.260 If the debtor is unable to reimburse the support obligation during 
the bankruptcy proceeding, then he or she will be liable to the DSO claimant 
post-petition.261 Despite the impact of super-priority benefits, Congress 
purposefully included them in the Code. When Congress drafted § 523 of the 
Code, it reiterated the notion that familial debts rightfully outweigh the debtor’s 
fresh start.262 Therefore, a broad definition of a DSO follows the intent of 
Congress.263 
C. The Substance of the Obligation: Distinguishing Between Child Support 
and Alimony 
To determine whether a debt falls within the nature of alimony, maintenance, 
or support, courts must consider the substance of the obligation. All support 
obligations are not the same. Particularly, courts should distinguish alimony 
from child support when deciphering if an overpaid support debt should be 
excepted from discharge or entitled to priority status. Generally, all support 
debts should be excepted from discharge; the overpayment of child support 
should be entitled to priority status whereas the overpayment of alimony should 
not. The analysis of the particular support obligation will help to explain this 
general rule and the exceptions that emerge.  
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Generally, the overpayment of child support should be excepted from 
discharge and entitled to priority status. Child support serves as an inherent 
requirement amongst split families within our society.264 Due to this societal 
construction, overpaid child support debts should be treated more favorably than 
overpaid alimony debts. “[M]odern child support treats parent-child ties as more 
lasting than spousal relationships and independent of the relationship between 
[parties].”265 In order to encourage support providers to continue making 
payments for their children, overpaid child support claimants must be 
reimbursed for support payments that were not necessary for the adequate care 
and protection of the child.  
Child support is a complex concept.266 It is essential to make sure children 
who are not residing with two parents are receiving adequate care and 
protection.267 Often times, individuals end up as overpaid child support 
claimants when state courts retroactively terminate support payments.268 When 
a state court determines that a support provider has overpaid child support, there 
should be a more forgiving interpretation allowing for reimbursement within the 
Code. It is likely that overpayments of child support emerge from good faith 
intentions for the protection, safety, nourishment, and health of the child or 
children involved. Hence, the overpayment falls within the nature of support. 
The overpaying support claimant should not be penalized for doing everything 
in his or her power to provide for his or her children. Therefore, all overpayments 
of child support should be excepted from discharge and entitled to priority status.  
When overpaid child support claimants are not rightfully reimbursed, 
consequences arise. “There is a strong public policy objective of protecting the 
best interests of the child.”269 Financial support is pertinent so that the child will 
not suffer economic hardships due to the parents’ action or inaction.270 The 
concept of the best interest of the child will be overlooked if these creditors are 
not reimbursed. If a child support provider is aware that his or her ex-spouse is 
suffering from financial hardships, which is not rare before, during, or after a 
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divorce proceeding, the provider may be inclined to stop providing child support 
payments. This is because the support provider is aware that he or she might not 
be reimbursed if the payments are eventually deemed to be unnecessary funds 
in front of a bankruptcy court. The judicial branch should be encouraging 
payments of child support, not discouraging. This is a detrimental effect arising 
from bankruptcy courts ruling that overpaid child support debts are either not 
entitled to priority status or entirely dischargeable under the Code. 
Two exceptions arise when confronted with overpaid child support 
obligations. The first exception pertains to priority status. When the creditor is 
knowingly overpaying his or her child support, that creditor should not be 
afforded priority status. If the overpayment is not controlled by some sort of 
pending litigation and the creditor is aware that the payments he or she is making 
are not court ordered, then it follows that the debt should not fall within the 
definition of a DSO and therefore should not be entitled to priority status. Even 
though the debt is not categorized as a DSO in the nature of alimony, 
maintenance or support, it should still be excepted from discharge under 
§ 523(a)(15).271 Because child support is connected to the divorce decree, the 
debt should be deemed nondischargeable. Overall, when the creditor is fully 
aware that his or her child support payment is no longer enforced by the 
controlling state court, that creditor should not be afforded priority status 
because the child support debt is not a domestic support obligation in the nature 
of support.  
The second exception pertains to exceptions to discharge. When an overpaid 
child support claimant does not have primary custody of the children involved, 
and the quality of life of the young children is inadequate, the overpayment 
should be dischargeable in a bankruptcy proceeding. In other words, if the debtor 
has primary custody of the children and the payments from the creditor are 
necessary for the adequate care of the children, the creditor should not be 
reimbursed when the debt amounts to an overpayment. This goes back to the 
public policy objective of serving the best interests of the child.272 If the child in 
question is not receiving adequate care, society must do everything it can to 
protect this child. Courts must take this scenario into consideration when 
determining if a debt should be excepted from discharge. Even though the debt 
is connected to a divorce decree, the interests of the child outweigh the rights of 
the creditor. In this sense, the DSO is still due and owing to the child in the care 
of the debtor.  
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In comparison to the overpayments of child support, the overpayments of 
maintenance and alimony should not be treated as favorably. This is partly 
because “parenting involves a more predictable set of obligations” than 
marriage.273 In other words, the parent-child relationship lasts longer than the 
spousal relationship.274 Furthermore, child support payments are much more 
important than alimony payments. When confronted with alimony payments, the 
person receiving support is an adult capable of providing for themselves; when 
confronted with child support payments, the person receiving support is a minor 
who is incapable of providing for themselves. Because of this distinction, 
overpaid alimony claimants should not be afforded all of the rights that overpaid 
child support claimants receive. Generally, the overpayment of alimony should 
not be entitled to priority status but should always be excepted from discharge.  
When confronted with an alimony payment, the person providing support 
should be held to a higher standard of diligence. This standard should be applied 
because the person providing support is generally an adult who is capable of 
providing for his or her own self. Furthermore, “[c]urrent social attitudes seem 
to hold that women and men have equal opportunities to become self-supporting 
in the paid work-force and equal obligations with respect to home and family 
care.”275 This statement supports the proposition that current trends have been 
moving toward providing alimony as a rehabilitative tool and not a lifelong 
safety net.276 Because modern day alimony payments serve to prepare the former 
spouse’s entrance into the workforce,277 the person providing support should be 
up-to-date and cognizant of the alimony payments that he or she is ordered to 
provide by the court. If, after satisfying all payment obligations, the support 
provider continues making payments without realizing that such payments are 
no longer mandated, the burden should be placed on the overpaying creditor in 
a bankruptcy proceeding.  
This standard of diligence takes an overpaid alimony debt and renders it a 
money judgement within the Code. The debt is connected to a divorce decree 
and hence excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(15).278 The overpaid alimony 
creditor, in being held to this standard of diligence, retains a claim that is not in 
the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support. Therefore, the claim is not 
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categorized as a DSO. Due to this distinction, the creditor should not be afforded 
priority status, but rather be treated as a general unsecured claimant whose debt 
is excepted from discharge. 
One exception arises from this general rule. This exception pertains to 
priority status. If the alimony provider is being manipulated by the alimony 
recipient in a way that is deemed to be malicious and deceitful, the support 
provider should be entitled to priority status for his or her overpaid alimony debt. 
This often occurs when ex-spouses have a hostile relationship. Oftentimes, when 
the recipient remarries, the alimony provider’s payment obligations terminate. 
In an effort to sustain alimony payments, the ex-spouse that contemplated 
remarriage may decide to reside with his or her new partner in a way that 
resembles a common-law marriage.279 This is a form of manipulation because if 
there had not been alimony payments, the ex-spouse would remarry without 
hesitation. In situations like these, the overpaid alimony creditor should be 
afforded first priority status because the payment would amount to a DSO in the 
nature of alimony, maintenance, or support.  
The substance of the obligation must be scrutinized when deciding if an 
overpaid support debt should be entitled to priority status or excepted from 
discharge. Alimony must be distinguished from child support because each 
obligation provides its own, distinct function. Children are dependent upon 
support because they do not have the capacity to provide for themselves, 
whereas full-grown adults do retain this capacity. Overall, all support debts 
should be excepted from discharge. With respect to a few previously noted 
exceptions, the overpayment of child support should be entitled to priority status, 
whereas the overpayment of alimony should not. 
D. The Intent and Current Condition of the Parties Involved 
To further understand how overpaid support creditors should be treated 
within the Code, specific facts pertaining to the parties involved must be 
considered. The Code dictates that a debt in the nature of alimony, maintenance, 
or support is considered a DSO.280 Whether an overpaid support obligation falls 
within this definition of a DSO is dependent on a multitude of fact-specific 
criteria.281 An inquiry into these factors is necessary to determine if overpaid 
support debts are (1) defined as DSOs, (2) excepted from discharge, and (3) 
entitled to priority status.  
 
 279 See In re Alewelt, 520 B.R. 704, 706 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2014). 
 280 See 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A) (2019).  
 281 See Gordon, supra note 81, at 61. 
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Time and time again, bankruptcy courts have noted that an insight into the 
intent and current condition of the parties involved is necessary in understanding 
the debt in question.282 Furthermore, even though labels attached to debts can be 
helpful in deciphering intent, “[t]he nature of the obligation is not restricted to 
the parties’ label in the settlement agreement . . . .”283 Two perspectives must be 
analyzed when looking at both the intent and the conditions of the parties. The 
perspective of the creditor and the perspective of the debtor must be illustrated 
respectively in order to understand why (1) the overpayment of child support 
should be entitled to priority status, whereas the overpayment of alimony and 
maintenance should not, and (2) all domestic support obligations are excepted 
from discharge. This analysis will further help to explain the exceptions to these 
standards.  
1. Intent of the Parties  
To embark on this analysis, the intent of the creditor must be understood. All 
creditors that fall into this category have overpaid a support debt of some type 
at some point in their lives.284 How this overpayment occurred is a pertinent 
element for determining if the debt should be excepted from discharge or entitled 
to priority status. The creditor can exhibit one of two intentions. The creditor 
could either knowingly overpay the debt or unknowingly overpay the debt.  
When knowingly overpaying a support debt, the creditor’s claim should not 
fall within the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support. This is because the 
creditor is aware that his or her payments were completed and for some reason, 
the creditor has continued providing support. At this point, the debt is no longer 
in the nature of support. This is not because there is no “need” for support. 
Rather, it is because the payments are no longer mandated by court order. As 
previously discussed, when a creditor is knowingly overpaying a support debt 
that is not controlled by pending litigation, the creditor is at fault for providing 
such overpayments and should not be entitled to priority status.  
A different outcome results when the creditor unknowingly overpays a 
support debt.285 This analysis is complicated because it is dependent on the facts 
of the specific case. This often occurs when a court retroactively terminates 
support obligations. If the overpaid support debt at issue is a child support order, 
 
 282 See Taylor v. Taylor (In re Taylor), 737 F.3d 670, 676–77 (10th Cir. 2013). 
 283 See id. 
 284 See, e.g., id.; Norbut v. Norbut (In re Norbut), 387 B.R. 199, 210 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2008). 
 285 See In re Alewelt, 520 B.R. 704, 712 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2014) (alimony payments were retroactively 
terminated but the court found no “need” for the funds).  
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then it will be more likely than not that the debt should be afforded first 
priority.286 If the child is deemed to have been provided with adequate care, then 
there is no reason that the debt should not be returned as a DSO. This is true 
because the debt is in the nature of support because the creditor believed the 
payment was necessary for the adequate care and protection of the child or 
children involved. On the contrary, if the creditor unknowingly overpaid an 
alimony debt it is more likely than not that the creditor will not be afforded 
priority status.287 This is because a higher standard of diligence288 should be 
placed on overpaying alimony creditors in a bankruptcy proceeding. Current 
trends show that alimony serves as a rehabilitative tool and not a lifelong safety 
net.289 Thus, the creditor should carry the responsibility of knowing how long 
and to what extent alimony payments are needed.  
While looking at intent, a deeper analysis of the debtor’s motives for filing 
a bankruptcy petition is needed. A bankruptcy court should evaluate a debtor’s 
history and ask: why is this individual filing for bankruptcy? If it seems as if the 
debtor is filing for relief predominantly to escape the overpaid DSO, red flags 
should be raised. For instance, in the case of In re Galiardo the support receiver 
debtor owed the support provider creditor over $200,000 in overpaid alimony 
payments.290 It is likely that these debts triggered the filing of the bankruptcy 
petition. In these situations, a court should scrutinize the situation to see if the 
debtor is acting deceitful and declare the debt as a DSO prohibiting the debtor 
from taking advantage of the chapter 13 loophole.291 However, if a debtor is 
filing for bankruptcy predominately for other purposes, such as foreclosure or 
consumer debt, the court does not have to scrutinize the debtor so closely.  
Overall, the intent analysis requires courts to explore the perspectives of both 
the creditor and debtor. If a creditor knowingly overpays a support debt, then the 
debt is no longer within the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support and, 
therefore, should not be entitled to priority status. The current structure of the 
Code allows these debts to be discharged in chapter 13 cases.292 However, if a 
creditor unknowingly overpays a support debt, a further analysis of the substance 
of the obligation is needed. Creditors who overpay alimony are held to a higher 
 
 286 See, e.g., Kerr v. Meadors (In re Knott), 482 B.R. 852, 856 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2012). 
 287 See generally Galiardo v. Galiardo (In re Galiardo), 526 B.R. 897 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2013). 
 288 See supra Part C.  
 289 See McMullen, supra note 52, at 9.  
 290 See In re Galiardo, 526 B.R. at 899.  
 291 See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(2) (2019) (noting that debts listed in §523(a)(15) are dischargeable in a chapter 
13 proceeding).  
 292 See id. 
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standard of diligence than those who overpay child support. Furthermore, the 
debtor’s motives for filing the petition must be considered. If the court finds that 
the debtor filed their petition predominately to escape the overpaid DSO, the 
debt should be found in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support to avoid 
the debtor benefiting from the chapter 13 loophole.  
2. Current Condition of the Parties  
After analyzing the intent of the parties, the court must consider the parties’ 
current physical, mental, and financial condition. How a family functions is 
critical in determining how a debt should be treated within a bankruptcy 
proceeding. Regardless of whether the overpaid debt arises from child support 
or alimony, the quality of care and the quality of life must be considered. The 
undertaking of this analysis is case-specific in most circumstances. Because 
child support and alimony are two distinct obligations, each one must be 
considered separately. This inquiry is more relevant for cases concerning 
overpaid child support orders. 
When confronted with an overpaid child support debt, the court should look 
to the current condition and treatment of the children. The age of the child or 
children determines how much scrutiny the court needs to place on analyzing 
the obligation. If the child is under sixteen years old, the court should be 
extremely thorough in its investigation.293 However, the main aspect a court 
must analyze, irrespective of age, is the quality of care the child is currently 
receiving. If the overpayment is deemed necessary for adequate care, then the 
debt should not be afforded priority status and should be discharged in a 
bankruptcy proceeding. Once again, the rights of a child outweigh both the 
creditor’s rights and the debtor’s rights.294 When looking to the best interest of 
a child, there should always be a level of adequate care and protection 
provided.295 If the court finds the overpayment is not necessary for the adequate 
care of the children involved, the debt should be considered a DSO in the nature 
of alimony, maintenance, or support. Unless the creditor is knowingly 
overpaying, an overpaid child support debt should always be considered a DSO 
that is excepted from discharge and afforded first priority status.  
 
 293 See United States Age of Consent Map, https://www.ageofconsent.net/states (last visited Feb. 25, 2019) 
(This age derived from the majority age of consent in the United States). 
 294 See generally Sarah Abramowicz, Beyond Family Law, 63 CASE W. RES. 293, 299300 (2012). 
 295 See generally 3 NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE: MATRIMONIAL ACTIONS § 40.03 (2018) (This source 
describes New York law and procedure but mirrors jurisdictions throughout the United States).  
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When confronted with an overpaid alimony debt, the court should look to 
the condition of the debtor. When analyzing the debtor’s quality of life, the 
debtor’s condition must be analyzed in connection with the divorce decree. If 
the court finds the overpayment was necessary296 according to the divorce 
decree, then the debt may still be nondischargeable because it falls under 
§ 523(a)(15).297 However, because of its nature, it should not be afforded first 
priority status. Rather, it should be treated as a general unsecured claim. This 
scenario protects the fresh start of the debtor. This situation is highly unlikely 
because once a divorce is finalized, the alimony receiver is commonly required 
to begin providing for him or herself rendering excess alimony payments 
unnecessary.298  
In most instances, where the overpayment is considered unnecessary, there 
is no need to protect the debtor’s fresh start. This analysis is only needed in 
extreme circumstances that the general rule does not provide for. The condition 
of the creditor does not need to be scrutinized because it does not matter if the 
creditor “needs” the payment. If the debt falls within the nature of support the 
debt should automatically be a DSO that is both excepted from discharge and 
entitled to priority status. Though overpaid alimony creditors are held to a higher 
standard of diligence, courts must not confuse the word “need” for “nature” 
when rendering opinions on overpaid support debts. When confronted with an 
overpaid alimony debt, courts should declare the debt nondischargeable while 
denying priority status due to the substance of the obligation. 
Generally, the condition of the parties is a greater concern when analyzing 
an overpaid child support debt. As long as children are receiving adequate care, 
the general rule applies. Though the debtor’s quality of life may be analyzed 
when confronted with an overpaid alimony debt, it is highly unlikely that a court 
will find an overpayment necessary in accordance with the prescribed divorce 
decree.  
CONCLUSION  
The Code fails to directly address overpaid support debts, leaving case law 
as the sole source of guidance. The Code’s inattention to the issue has led to a 
jurisdictional split that does not allow for a uniform set of standards. When 
federal law is not evenly applied throughout the United States, the public’s 
 
 296 This scenario is very rare but may occur if the original divorce decree was insufficient for the needs of 
the parties.  
 297 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15) (2019). 
 298 See McMullen, supra note 52, at 8–9.  
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values become skewed and individuals may attempt to use this inconsistency to 
their advantage. Furthermore, when domestic relations are not left to the 
discretion of state courts, the balance between federal bankruptcy law and state 
domestic relations laws is disrupted. In order to reconcile this discrepancy, 
bankruptcy courts should allow for a uniform set of standards when confronted 
with overpaid support debts. 
While all support debts should be excepted from discharge, the overpayment 
of child support should be entitled to priority status whereas the overpayment of 
alimony should not. After analyzing Congress’s intent in drafting the Code, the 
intent and current condition of the parties, and the substance of the obligation, a 
few exceptions emerge to this general rule. First, creditors who knowingly 
overpay their child support debts should not be afforded priority status. Second, 
if the child’s quality of life is inadequate, the debt should neither be afforded 
priority status nor excepted from discharge when considering the public policy 
objective of protecting the best interests of the child.299 Third, exceptions to 
overpaid alimony debts arise when the debtor manipulates the creditor in a 
malicious or deceitful manner. When this occurs, the overpaid alimony debt 
must be afforded priority status.  
The chapter 13 loophole partially restricts the application of these standards. 
Because the application of § 523(a)(15) is conditional to chapter 7 cases, the 
Code unintentionally creates this loophole300 allowing individuals to discharge 
large sums of money stemming from a divorce decree. To close this gap, 
§ 523(a)(15) should apply to chapter 13 cases conditional to overpaid support 
obligations. If Congress elected to amend § 523(a)(15), debtors would not be 
able to specifically file or covert their case to chapter 13 in hopes of avoiding 
large sums of overpaid support debts.301 Currently, the only way to avoid this 
area of contention is for courts to scrutinize why a debtor is filing for bankruptcy 
to determine if he or she is acting deceitful.  
This Comment creates standards that stem from public policy concerns. The 
drafters of the Code sought to reflect the values and objectives of our society.302 
As society has evolved, it has become clearly discernable that the parent-child 
relationship is longer lasting than the spousal relationship.303 Due to this 
 
 299 See McMullen, supra note 266, at 442.  
 300 The chapter 13 discharge itself is not a loophole. When overpaid support debts get discharged is when 
the loophole emerges.  
 301 See Galiardo v. Galiardo (In re Galiardo), 526 B.R. 897, 902 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2013). 
 302 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 507, 523(a)(5) (2019). 
 303 See Cammett, supra note 265, at 132.  
NOWAK_7.15.20 7/15/2020 2:08 PM 
2020] WHERE’S MY REFUND? 549 
distinction, overpaying alimony creditors should be held to a higher standard of 
diligence than overpaying child support creditors.304 Moreover, the bankruptcy 
system must encourage parents to continue paying their child support without 
hesitation. Overpaid support debts should not be categorized as general 
unsecured claims in bankruptcy proceedings. This may cause future payees to 
withhold their child support payments when suspicion arises that an ex-spouse 
is suffering from financial hardship. In order to keep familial values in high 
regard, these general sets of standards must be followed when courts are 




 304 See Kelso, supra note 48, at 189. 
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